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Summary
this report investigates how Murle customary authorities in 
south-eastern South Sudan navigate and negotiate political, 
military and spiritual authority, while simultaneously challenging 
the view that Murle society has no organic leadership structures—
an idea often linked to negative stereotypes. 
the study emphasizes the resilience and adaptive edge of 
authority structures within Murle society. it demonstrates that the 
most successful customary authorities—in particular the position 
of red chiefs—are those who are able to combine spiritual power 
with other sources of authority. Historically the prime holders of 
law and order in their communities, red chiefs continue to derive 
their authority as a traditional God-given right, passed down from 
father to son. this is in contrast to the government chiefs—a legacy 
of the colonial system of indirect rule—who derive their authority 
from their relationship with the state. 
the power of red chiefs and that of government is simulta-
neously aligned and in competition. on the one hand, the most 
successful chiefs are those who embody multiple sources of power, 
combining traditional spiritual authority with that of government. 
on the other hand, in asserting their strength, members of the 
elite in government challenge the authority of red chiefs, partially 
alienating those same government officials from the population 
at large. in many cases, chiefs will occupy both the traditional and 
government forms of customary authority. Clearly, the challenge 
is not the lack of credible authority structures among the Murle, 
but rather their abundance and, as a consequence, the difficulties 
outsiders find navigating them.
this study, carried out through extensive interviews across 
Boma State between 2012 and 2017, draws heavily from the 
case of one of the most prominent political, military and spiritual 
leaders among the Murle, Sultan ismael Konyi. it demonstrates 
how the intersections between spiritual, political and military 
power and authority in Murle leadership structures are drawn 
from complex internal hierarchies and require skillful negotiation.
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1. Introduction
the Murle community from south-eastern South Sudan is often 
described as an acephalous society with elusive sources of 
authority and lacking credible and legitimate governance struc-
tures. this is not, however, an accurate picture. in fact, it may be 
the opposite. there are many alat ci merik1 (red chiefs) in each 
buul (age-set or generation) in each specific area—a village, cattle-
camp or town—who play important leadership roles. Red chiefs 
mediate conflicts within and beyond their own age-sets, speak on 
behalf of their groups, and influence, determine and have overall 
responsibility for their group’s actions. in this regard, the challenge 
is not the absence of leadership structures but rather their 
abundance. Consequently, it is important to be able to accurately 
identify the internal hierarchies of spiritual and political leadership 
and authority so as to better understand how community legiti-
macy and support is attained. 
this analysis of Murle chiefs draws on long-term field research 
in different locations across Boma State conducted between 2012 
and 2017, and in particular on interviews with a number of chiefs 
in Pibor town, including Sultan ismael Konyi, in october 2017.2 
the report counters the prevailing notion that Murle society has 
no organic leadership structures, which is often linked to negative 
stereotypes that represent the Murle community as ‘primitive 
and ungovernable’.3 international, national and local political 
discourses often portray the Murle community as principal aggres-
sors and the source of much of the instability affecting Jonglei 
and beyond ‘despite the reality of a politically and economically 
marginalized Murle’.4 the Murle are stereotyped as exceptionally 
violent and are generally blamed for incidents of conflict in Jonglei 
and elsewhere.5 Such negative stereotypes and accusations are 
partially driven by actual events, but are also manipulated by more 
dominant groups to serve political purposes.6
the intersections between spiritual, political and military 
power and authority in Murle leadership structures are complex. 
the most successful red chiefs are those who are able to combine 
spiritual with other sources of authority. as government authority 
grows, however, the spiritual and political power red chiefs wield 
is being challenged and is changing. this contributes to tensions 
1 the Murle language: 
Alat ci merik (plural form) 
and alan ci meri (singular 
form) for the term ‘red 
chief(s)’. it is an exclusively 
male position passed from 
father to son among leading 
families in a given drumship 
(clan). it is seen as a God-
given position.
2 the author wishes to 
thank Cherry leonardi and 
Jonathan arensen for helpful 
feedback on an earlier 
version of this report.
3 J. McCallum, ‘the Murle 
and the security complex in 
the South Sudan–ethiopia 
borderlands’, The Horn 
of Africa Bulletin, 25 July 
2017. accessed 4 June 
2018, http://life-peace.org/
hab/murle-sudan-ethiopia-
borderlands/.
4 a. laudati, ‘Victims 
of discourse: mobilizing 
narratives of fear and 
insecurity in post conflict 
South Sudan—the case 
of Jonglei State’, African 
Geopolitical Review 30/1 
(2011): 21.
5 J. McCallum and a. okech, 
‘Drivers of Conflict in 
Jonglei State’, Humanitarian 
Exchange Magazine, 
number 57, Humanitarian 
Practice Network, overseas 
Development institute, May 
2013. accessed 4 June 2018, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/
odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/
publications-opinion-
files/8777.pdf.
6 See D. Felix da Costa, 
‘“this Word, it is for Murle, 
Not Meant for other 
People”: the Politics of 
Murle identity, experiences 
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between the traditional spiritual authority of red chiefs and that 
of some Murle politicians who rely solely on the political and 
military power provided by their relationship with government. 
these sources of authority are sometimes in competition. at the 
same time, government authority can rely and build upon spiritual 
authority. For example, some of the most successful Murle political 
figures make use of their spiritual authority as red chiefs to speak 
the cultural, spiritual and political language that the majority of the 
rural Murle population understand and respect. in turn, this serves 
to alienate a significant portion of the class of Murle political elite, 
who privilege the language of government, education and quali-
fications. More tuned in to ideas of modernity, this political elite 
remains somewhat detached from a large part of Murle society. 
this analysis draws heavily on the case of one of the most 
prominent political, military and spiritual leaders among the 
Murle, Sultan ismael Konyi, who has effectively drawn upon and 
strategically deployed multiple sources of authority to strengthen 
his position amongst his community. this includes his role as a red 
chief, a prominent senior politician, a government official and a 
military commander who was the founder and head of the Pibor 
Defence Forces (PDF), aligned with Khartoum since the 1980s. the 
case of Sultan ismael Konyi also sheds more specific light on both 
the intersection of and tensions between spiritual and govern-
ment authority in Murle society.
of Violence and of the State 
in Boma, South Sudan’, PhD 
thesis, School of oriental 
and african Studies, 
University of london, 
london, 2016.
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2. The murle in the political 
context of South Sudan
Murle society is organized through three core interconnected social 
institutions: age-set or generation system (buul); red chiefs (alan 
ci merik); and clans or drumships (kidoŋwa). these three social 
institutions bind the Murle together as a group and shape Murle 
discourses about themselves as a distinctive and cohesive ethnic 
community. each age-set has its own red chiefs, with a hierarchy 
of authority determined by the clans, which establishes seniority 
within each age-set and across the Murle as a whole. the Murle 
are divided into four clans, or drumships, with respective sub-clans 
that divide between red chiefs and black commoners.7 the two 
larger clans are the Taŋajon and ŋarɔti, followed by the Keleŋnya 
and ŋenvac. there are red chiefs in all four clans, with those from 
the Taŋajon considered to have the greatest authority, followed by 
the ŋarɔti, Keleŋnya and ŋenvac, respectively.8 Within each clan, 
there are also complex and nuanced hierarchies and sub-clans, 
that establish seniority. the issue, then, is not the absence of 
complex leadership structures. Rather, it is the ability to navigate 
and understand them.
Despite a shared collective sense of ethnic identity through 
common social institutions, the Murle people of South Sudan have 
diverse experiences of recent history, ecology and landscape, thus 
also of livelihoods, legacies of conflict and even of the state.9 at 
the most basic level, the Murle are divided between the larger 
agro-pastoralist lowland Murle inhabiting the lotilla plains and 
the mostly agrarian highland Murle inhabiting the Boma Plateau. 
landscape and ecological differences have meant that the lowland 
and highland Murle have developed diverse sociocultural patterns, 
livelihood strategies and relationships with neighbouring commu-
nities.10 Whereas lowland Murle place cattle at the centre of social, 
political and economic life and follow seasonal transhumance 
migrations, highland Murle are predominantly sedentary cultiva-
tors who keep small livestock.11
the Murle community also have important historically 
entrenched divisions based on political allegiances that emerged 
during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005). During the 
second civil war, the town of Boma was taken by the Sudan People’s 
7 Historically, red chiefs 
got their name from the 
crimson bird feathers they 
wore on their foreheads, 
although now they often 
wear a red hat and other red 
pieces of clothing. the term 
‘black commoners’ refers to 
those that are not from red 
chief clans.
8 on clans, see: B. a. lewis, 
The Murle: Red Chiefs and 
Black Commoners, oxford: 
oxford University Press, 
1972, especially chapter 3.
9 See: Felix da Costa, ‘this 
Word, it is for Murle’; and 
e. andretta, ‘Symbolic 
Continuity, Material 
Discontinuity, and ethnic 
identity among Murle 
Communities in the 
Southern Sudan’, Ethnology 
28/1 (1989): 17–31.
10 D. Felix da Costa, ‘“We 
are one, but We are 
Different”: Murle identity 
and local Peacebuilding 
in Jonglei State, South 
Sudan’, Policy Brief, oslo: 
Norwegian Peacebuilding 
Resource Centre (NoReF), 
2013. accessed 4 June 
2018, http://www.
peacebuilding.no/Regions/
africa/Sudan-and-South-
Sudan/Publications/
We-are-one-but-we-are-
different-Murle-identity-
and-local-peacebuilding-in-
Jonglei-State-South-Sudan.
11 See: Felix da Costa, ‘this 
Word, it is for Murle’; and e. 
andretta, ‘a Reconsideration 
of the Basis of Group 
Cohesion among the 
Murle of Southern Sudan’, 
The Murle age-set system
the age-sets or generations (buul) are groups of men loosely based 
on age and with multiple social functions, to which a man will usually 
belong to all his life. Women will usually belong to their father's 
age-set until they marry (or are promised to marry someone), when 
they shift to belong to their husband's age-set. at present, the existing 
age-sets, from the youngest to the oldest, are:
Kurenen: emerging age-set born from late 1990s onwards, in compe-
tition with laŋo.
Laŋo: born 1980s–1990s–2000s, many took part in the Cobra Faction 
war, currently in competition with Kurenen and Bothonya.
Bothonya: born late 1970s–1980s–early 1990s; said to be the first 
age-set to fight younger age-sets with guns rather than sticks; age-set 
of David Yau Yau and many that took part in the Cobra Faction war.
Thithi: born 1960s–1970s; the age-set of a large number of the Cobra 
Faction leadership; dominance still contested with Bothonya.
Muden: born 1950s–1960s; an age set that joined the PDF.
Doroŋwa: born 1940s–1950s; the age-set of ismael Konyi.
Maara: born 1930s-1940s.
Nyeriza: born 1920s-1930s.
Nyakademu: born 1910-1920s, few remaining members.
* For further discussion of the Murle age-set system, see: J. arensen, Mice are Men: language 
and Society among the Murle of Sudan, international Museum of Cultures no. 27, Dallas: 
international Museum of Cultures, 1992.
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PhD thesis, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
1985.
12 the name ‘Berget’ is 
how the word ‘brigade’ 
is appropriated in the 
Murle language. 
13 McCallum, ‘the Murle 
and the security complex’. 
14 See: Felix da Costa, ‘this 
Word, it is for Murle’; and J. 
McCallum, ‘Murle identity in 
Post-Colonial South Sudan’, 
PhD thesis, York University, 
York, 2013, especially 
chapter 5.
15 See: McCallum, ‘the 
Murle and the security 
complex’. the first step in 
a gradual reconciliation 
and cessation of hostilities 
between Murle communities 
divided partly by opposing 
loyalties to the Sudanese 
government and SPlM/a, 
and their neighbours, 
took place in lekuangole 
in June 2003, under the 
auspices of the Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan–Pibor, 
with follow-up meetings in 
Boma in February 2004 and 
again lekuangole in June 
2005. See: M. Bradbury, 
J. Ryle, M. Medley and K. 
Sansculotte-Greenidge, 
‘local Peace Processes in 
Sudan: a Baseline Study’, 
london: Rift Valley institute, 
2006, 156–158. accessed 4 
June 2018, http://riftvalley.
net/publication/local-
peace-processes-sudan. 
For background on intra-
Murle reconciliation, see 
McCallum, ‘Murle identity in 
Post-Colonial South Sudan’, 
2013, chapter 2, especially 
44–48. For a discussion of 
the PDF’s integration into 
the SPla, see: M. arnold, 
‘the South Sudan Defence 
Force: Patriots, Collaborators 
or Spoilers?’, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 
liberation Movement/army (SPlM/a) and Pibor was largely under 
the control of Khartoum. internally, the Murle were split between 
those in Boma, who largely supported the SPlM/a, and those who 
fought with ismael Konyi’s Popular Defence Forces (PDF). the PDF 
is known as the ‘Brigade’, or more commonly, the ‘Berget’,12 a local 
Murle militia in Pibor that was aligned with the Khartoum govern-
ment and established to protect the Murle community from 
‘predation by the neighbouring Dinka and Nuer, who dominated 
the leadership of the SPlM/a’.13 Decisions regarding the side on 
which people fought were often based on practical concerns, such 
as who was in control of the physical location where a person 
was or had been displaced to, rather than political or ideological 
considerations.14 Despite the organization of peace and reconcili-
ation meetings in the years leading up to the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace agreement (CPa) and the 2006 Juba Declaration—when 
the PDF and other militia groups under the South Sudan Defence 
Forces (SSDF) were integrated into the SPla—unresolved political 
divisions linked to historical tensions between the PDF and the 
SPla still permeate Murle political dynamics.15  
Since the 2005 CPa, violence in Jonglei has been multi faceted, 
with some areas, especially the Murle home of former Pibor 
County (now in Boma State), experiencing a deterioration of 
security. Jonglei State was affected the most by both communal 
and political conflicts.16 across Jonglei, neighbouring ethnic groups 
continued to engage in intercommunal conflicts, accompanied by 
mass killings, cattle raids and abductions of women and children, 
in addition to local feuds at the village level. the rebellions of the 
late George athor in 2010 and David Yau Yau in 2010 and 2012, 
both supported with weapons from the Khartoum government, 
contributed to a wide availability of arms and ammunition.
intercommunal conflict between the lou Nuer and Murle 
escalated and became increasingly violent in 2009–2011.17 tactics 
changed, with attacks no longer being solely focused on capturing 
cattle, but also targeting entire villages, killing women, children 
and the elderly, and looting and destroying homes, state infra-
structure and NGo facilities. this new era of violence is seen as 
having started with a lou Nuer attack on lekuangole between 5 
and 8 March 2009, where some 450 mainly women and children 
were killed.18 From March 2009 to March 2012, more than 1,800 
lou Nuer people were killed by Murle and 134,000 cattle taken.19 
in turn, more than 2,000 Murle were killed in lou Nuer attacks 
and more than 628,000 cattle taken, in addition to unaccounted 
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numbers of civilians displaced on both sides.20
the government of South Sudan responded by initiating 
another round of civilian disarmament of all groups in Jonglei 
State, the fifth SPla-led disarmament campaign in Jonglei since 
2007.21 the SPla battalion responsible for disarmament in Pibor 
was, however, mostly made up of officers from the Nuer and Dinka 
ethnic groups, who took the chance to avenge earlier Murle cattle 
raids and attacks on their own communities.22 By May 2012, this 
had effectively become a forced disarmament campaign, partic-
ularly in the plains of Pibor County, where the SPla reportedly 
committed rapes, simulated drowning and carried out other 
serious abuses.23 in addition to previous unresolved political 
grievances, the SPla’s violent disarmament campaign motivated 
Murle rebel leader David Yau Yau to resume his 2010 rebellion. 
the violent actions of the SPla against Murle civilians also encour-
aged many Murle men to join David Yau Yau’s rebellion, in the 
form of the South Sudan Defence Movement/army–Cobra Faction 
(SSDM/a–CF), as a way to protect their communities, capitalizing 
on the feelings of resentment, distrust and marginalization among 
the Murle population toward the SPla.24 Yau Yau called for greater 
representation for the Murle in government and the creation of a 
Murle state. 
Since the national conflict between the SPla and the 
SPla-in-opposition (SPla-io) began on 15 December 2013, the 
dynamics of the conflict in Pibor have changed significantly for the 
better. the area went from being the most unstable to one of the 
quietest in the Greater Upper Nile region.25 With the government 
of South Sudan keen to have the Cobra Faction and the Murle 
ethnic group on its side, a peace deal was signed on 9 May 2014 in 
addis ababa. this included provisions for the establishment of the 
Greater Pibor administrative area (GPaa), answering the Cobra 
Faction’s calls for greater government representation and an inde-
pendent state. the GPaa consisted of the counties of Pibor and 
Pochalla, formerly part of Jonglei State, and home to the Murle, 
anyuak, Jie and Kachipo ethnic communities. the Cobra Faction 
and the Murle community at large committed to stay neutral in the 
wider conflict. David Yau Yau was appointed chief administrator, 
a position he held until shortly after the government’s creation 
of 28 new states, which replaced the 10 previous constitutionally 
established states, in october 2015. at this time, the GPaa became 
Boma State, still composed of former Pibor and Pochalla counties. 
45/04 (2007): 489–516.
16 Small arms Survey, ‘My 
Neighbour, My enemy: inter-
tribal Violence in Jonglei’, 
Sudan issue Brief Number 
21, Human Security Baseline 
assessment, Geneva: Small 
arms Survey, Graduate 
institute of international 
and Development 
Studies, 2012. accessed 
4 June 2018, http://www.
smallarmssurveysudan.org/
fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/
HSBa-iB21-inter-tribal_
violence_in_Jonglei.pdf.
17 e. thomas, South Sudan: 
A Slow Liberation, london: 
Zed Books, 2015; and Small 
arms Survey, ‘My Neighbour, 
My enemy’.
18 Small arms Survey, ‘My 
Neighbour, My enemy’, 2.
19 Small arms survey, ‘My 
Neighbour, My enemy’, 3.
20 Small arms survey, ‘My 
Neighbour, My enemy’, 3.
21 J. Young, ‘Jonglei 
2010: another Round of 
Disarmament’, Situation 
Report, Pretoria: institute 
for Security Studies, 2010. 
accessed 4 June 2018, 
http://www.issafrica.org/
uploads/May2010Jonglei.
pdf; ‘No one to intervene: 
Gaps in Civilian Protection in 
South Sudan’, Human Rights 
Watch. accessed 4 June 
2018, http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2009/06/21/no-one-
intervene-0; and R. Garfield, 
‘Violence and Victimization 
after Civilian Disarmament: 
the Case of Jonglei’, Geneva: 
Small arms Survey, Graduate 
institute of international 
and Development Studies, 
2007. accessed 4 June 2018, 
http://www.ecoi.net/file_
upload/1002_1257164736_
swp-11-jonglei-violence.pdf.
22 McCallum and okech, 
‘Drivers of Conflict in Jonglei 
State’.
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By December 2015, the government had removed Yau Yau from 
leadership and installed long-term SPlM supporter Baba Medan as 
governor of Boma State, resulting in intra-Murle violence (between 
supporters of the two leaders) affecting the area once again.26 By 
January 2017, President Salva Kiir Mayardit had replaced Medan 
with Sultan ismael Konyi as governor of Boma State, a position 
he kept until 26 January 2018, when Kiir once again appointed 
David Yau Yau as governor.27 the political dynamics in Boma State 
continue to be delicate. they are connected to wider national 
political maneuverings, fragile relationships with neighbours and 
challenging intra-Murle elite political divisions, with powerful 
individuals drawing support from youth in their home areas and 
making use of the age-set system to build their own private armies. 
23 amnesty international, 
‘South Sudan: lethal 
Disarmament—abuses 
Related to Civilian 
Disarmament in Pibor 
County, Jonglei State’, 
london: amnesty 
international Publications, 
2012; and ‘“they are 
Killing Us”. abuses against 
Civilians in South Sudan’s 
Pibor County’, Human Rights 
Watch. accessed 4 June 
2018, https://www.hrw.
org/report/2013/09/12/
they-are-killing-us/abuses-
against-civilians-south-
sudans-pibor-county.
24 Felix da Costa, ‘this 
Word, it is for Murle’.
25 C. todisco, ‘Real but 
Fragile: the Greater Pibor 
administrative area’, 
Number 35, Geneva: Small 
arms Survey, Graduate 
institute of international 
and Development Studies, 
March 2015.
26 See: ‘Clashes in Pibor 
involving Governor Baba’s 
guards’, Radio tamazuj, 
24 February 2016. accessed 
4 June 2018,  https://
radiotamazuj.org/en/news/
article/clashes-in-pibor-
involving-governor-baba-
s-guards; and ‘Dozens 
wounded in Pibor clashes’, 
Radio tamazuj, 25 February 
2016. accessed 4 June 2018, 
https://radiotamazuj.org/
en/news/article/dozens-
wounded-in-pibor-clashes. 
27 ‘Kiir sacks three states’ 
governors’, Radio tamazuj, 
27 January 2018. accessed 
4 June 2018, https://
radiotamazuj.org/en/news/
article/kiir-sacks-two-states-
governors.
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3. The meanings of chiefs among the Murle
‘People still respect red chiefs. It’s like a snake and its children. 
If it bites you, you will still die.’28
Historically, red chiefs were the prime holders of law and order in 
their communities. in places where the state does not reach—in 
villages and cattle-camps—they continue to play this role. in towns 
and other semi-urban areas, the role of red chiefs has changed. 
this change is explained by Chief Wowo Bodo, a red chief from 
the ŋarɔti clan and former chief of taŋajon village, who had been 
promoted as a chief in the high court in Pibor: ‘Before, it was only 
red chiefs in charge but now there is government on top of that. 
People have become arrogant.’29
When referring to chiefs among the Murle, it is possible to 
distinguish between what are intrinsically Murle traditional lead-
ership structures (red chiefs) and those introduced by colonial 
authorities (government chiefs). the latter were established and 
appointed by the colonial government as part of the system of 
indirect rule. Government chiefs are locally known by the arabic 
terms of ‘sheik’ or ‘omda’, and a paramount chief as ‘sultan’. 
although not always the case, and there is some variation across 
Murleland, in most instances government chiefs are also red 
chiefs.30 For instance, most Murle chiefs serving in the high court 
in Pibor are both government chiefs and red chiefs.31  
the standard Murle word for leader or chief is ‘alan’, usually 
referring to a red chief. Charburo lokoli, the paramount chief of 
Kongor and a red chief from the ŋarɔti clan explains:
Since the beginning, we are the people from above. … From the 
beginning, people were without anyone to lead them, so God 
sent us to lead. the original meaning of ‘alan’ is ‘to rescue’. if 
i say something, no one will deny it or challenge it. if someone 
does, i can curse them.32
thus, the original meaning of the term alludes to how Murle 
perceive red chiefs but also increasingly to the idea of chiefs more 
generally as protectors, rescuers and guides of the community. Red 
chiefs are spiritual men said to have gained their power directly 
from God (Tammu) and as such, with spiritual authority to rule. 
28 interview with elder from 
Murle chief’s court in Juba, 
Konyo Konyo area, Juba, 
16 october 2017.
29 interview with Wowo 
Bodo, red chief from the 
ŋarɔti clan and former 
government chief of 
taŋajon; currently part of 
the chief’s high court in 
Pibor town, Pibor town, 
19 october 2017.  
30 this appears to be 
generally the case in the 
lowlands but not in the 
highlands. 
31 according to amoyo 
Kiron theuwa, since the 
position of paramount chief 
was created by colonial 
authorities, all Murle 
paramount chiefs (apart 
from the first one) have 
been red chiefs. the first 
paramount chief appointed 
by the British was Jakor 
Beo, who was a black 
commoner. He was followed 
by lotillem, Korok Ngayon, 
ismael Konyi, ŋantho Kavula 
and Nyikcho ame Bolen 
(current paramount chief), 
all of whom are red chiefs. 
interview with amoyo Kiron 
theuwa, red chief from the 
taŋajon clan and deputy 
paramount chief of Pibor 
South county, Pibor town, 
21 october 2017.  
32 interview with Charburo 
lokoli, red chief from the 
ŋarɔti clan and paramount 
chief of Kongor, thithi  
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Hence, the power of red chiefs is not something given in this life 
but is inherited from father to son as a God-given position. For this 
reason, the authority of red chiefs is perceived by many to be more 
valuable and legitimate than the power derived from government, 
although this is also contested. as one red chief from the Bothonya 
generation from Wunkok village notes, ‘the strongest and most 
important is a red chief; that [power] can never be taken away 
from you. the other [government chief] is just a promotion.’33 
Some observers regard the position of red chiefs as religious 
rather than political.34 the spiritual authority of red chiefs, 
however, has provided them with the social legitimacy to make 
and impose moral claims with wide social repercussions and to 
take decisions that have political implications. in this sense, it is 
possible to say that red chiefs also hold political authority, which 
is even more so the case when government chiefs draw on their 
authority as red chiefs. 
Sultan ismael Konyi, himself also a red chief from the ŋarɔti 
clan, elaborates the importance of red chiefs among the Murle 
and the roles he thinks they continue to play in maintaining social 
stability and governing society:
When i was born, i found my clan were already red chiefs. 
i asked my parents about being a red chief and they told me 
that it is something that God gave to the clan during the time 
of creation. i then asked them to explain to me the role of a red 
chief. they told me that the role of a red chief is to resolve all 
the problems in society. For example, murder, theft and adultery 
cases. and whatever the red chief says, people will always 
respect his decision. if a person commits a murder and runs to 
the red chief’s home, no one from the deceased’s family will try 
to revenge that death. they understand red chiefs were sent by 
God to save people from the suffering that they experienced 
due to lack of leadership among them before. Murle people 
well understand the role of red chiefs in the community. if i say 
anything or i make any decision, people will respect what i say. 
and if you visit my elder brother’s home, you will find a drum 
that was used by our ancestors a long time ago. But red chiefs 
are not doing witchcraft. it’s just a system used to govern society. 
Some communities, such as the anyuak and Shilluk, have kings.35 
the role of government chiefs has come to resemble the role of red 
chiefs as understood by Sultan ismael, in terms of restoring order, 
peace and customary justice. Referring to the role of government 
age-set, Pibor town, 
19 october 2017.
33 interview with red chief 
from the taŋajon clan, 
Bothonya age-set from 
Wunkok village, Pibor town, 
20 october 2017.
34 J. arensen, ‘Murle 
Political Systems and age-
Sets’, paper presented at 
aeCoM Jonglei conference, 
Nairobi, Kenya, March 2012.
35 interview with Sultan 
ismael Konyi, Pibor town, 
21 october 2017.
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chiefs, John Kaka, at the time, the county commissioner of Pibor 
South, explains:
Chiefs are actually selected in each payam [second lowest 
administrative division, below counties] to solve issues that 
local people face. For example, if someone kills someone in any 
payam, the killer will go to the chief’s home, where he will be 
protected and brought to government because we don’t have 
prisons in that area. But we put the [government] chief who 
is a red chief at the same time to be our protector. if you kill 
someone, you’ll run to the chief, whether [you killed] intention-
ally or unintentionally. You’ll run to the chief. and the chief will 
be feared by everybody. For example, during those days when 
our culture was still actually believed by our people, if the chief 
said stop, people would stop. People would listen to him. they 
would hear him. even the wife of a chief would be able to stop 
any group of people mobilizing to come to the chief’s home. 
that’s why now the role of chief in areas where i’m not present 
can take over my activities, which the simple ones can be solved 
by them. the difficult ones, like killings, will be brought to me 
and will then be taken to the high court where we have selected 
other chiefs to take over such kind of activities.36
What the (former) commissioner’s account reveals is that even the 
cases that are considered to be too serious and difficult to resolve 
individually by red chiefs or government chiefs in rural areas, and 
are thus brought to government in town, are then taken back to be 
addressed in the chief’s high court in Pibor. this court is composed 
of senior government chiefs who are also red chiefs. the role of 
chiefs in maintaining social order and justice across Murle areas 
remains vital.   
at the same time, perhaps Chief Charburo, Sultan ismael and 
the former commissioner are referring to the power red chiefs used 
to hold. Kaku aturuk Kutura was one of the founders and senior 
commanders in the PDF, alongside Sultan ismael. He laments the 
decrease in the authority of red chiefs:
the role of the chief is to guide Murle in issues related to cattle, 
and of anything else in the community. these things have been 
spoiled now. it is these generations since the Bothonya [age-set] 
that have changed things. Before, if a red chief spoke, everyone 
respected his words [but now] it’s like politics or modern civi-
lization are causing misunderstandings. Some years ago, when 
36 interview John Kaka, 
(former) former county 
commissioner of Pibor 
South, Pibor town, 
24 october 2017.
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my age-set fought each other, if one red chief came and told us 
to stop or he’d curse us, we always stopped. i don’t know about 
these new generations. they’ve become mad. i don’t know.37 
Kaku, now an elder from the Doroŋwa age-set, is referring to the 
important role that red chiefs have had in mediating and regu-
lating competition and fighting within and between age-sets. the 
highly functional buul (age-sets) are arguably the most cohesive 
social institution holding Murle society together. these genera-
tional groups, however, have also become one of the major causes 
of intra-Murle violent conflict. age-sets comprise groups of men 
loosely based on age, to which a man will belong all his life. they 
provide men with a meaningful sense of belonging to a social 
group, with ties and loyalties between those of the same age-set 
sometimes stronger than those between relatives and brothers 
from competing age-sets. the age-set system has multiple social 
functions and remains a core element of Murle society—in 
everyday discussions, social relationships and friendships, in the 
ways in which cattle raids are conducted, in military mobilization, 
and in political allegiances and orchestrations. age-sets are also 
used to divide labour and responsibilities in the dry season, when 
youth in particular have specific roles in annual pastoralist migra-
tions. Until the emergence of the Bothonya age-set, competition 
between the two youngest age-sets was considered to be a rite 
of passage, regulated by older age-sets and usually conducted 
through stick-fighting, with red chiefs able to control disputes. 
these competitions, however, have grown increasingly violent and 
harder to control. 
Chief Charburo explains the role he believes red chiefs still 
have in mediating age-set competition:  
For example, if laŋo and Kurenen are fighting, i’ll intervene. i’ll 
use power as a red chief by using a spear and marking a line on 
the ground: ‘Whoever crosses that line will die!’ they’ll fear and 
they’ll stop. … Before, in the time of my father, there was no 
government and fewer crimes. But now things are worse. Now, 
age-sets are using guns instead of sticks, from the Bothonya and 
laŋo onwards.38
in principle, disputes within an age-set are resolved by the red 
chiefs of that particular age-set. Disputes between age-sets are 
also addressed through the most senior red chiefs of the two 
age-sets that are involved in the dispute. if necessary, for example 
37 interview with Kaku 
aturuk Kutura, founder and 
former PDF commander, 
Doroŋwa age-set, Juba, 
16 october 2017.
38 interview with Chief 
Charburo lokoli, red chief 
from the ŋarɔti clan and 
paramount chief of Kongor, 
Pibor town, 19 october 
2017.
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because a dispute has escalated, red chiefs from older age-sets 
will also mediate, as Chief Charburo indicates above. in practice, 
however, serious age-set fighting has become difficult for some 
red chiefs to manage, unless they have alternative or additional 
sources of power and authority, such as military or government 
power, to threaten and coerce the enforcement of the decisions 
of those red chiefs. For example, in october 2017, there were 
uneasy relations between the Bothonya and laŋo age-sets in parts 
of Boma State. in 2016 and the first half of 2017, there had also 
been more serious clashes between the laŋo and Kurenen, the 
youngest age-set, the presence of which was still limited to wider 
lekuangole and to Manyirang payam in Pibor but not elsewhere 
in Murleland.39
Competition between the youngest age-sets has become 
increasingly brutal and a source of violence due to the growing 
militarization of youth and widespread availability of firearms.40 as 
a result, red chiefs are no longer able to regulate age-set competi-
tion in the ways that they did in the past. one twenty-year-old man 
from the Kurenen age-set in Manyirang payam had clear thoughts 
on these social changes:
Chiefs have become less important. they are not as important as 
during the time of our fathers because in this age-set [Kurenen] 
sometimes there are very many people who are challenging 
things. like when the red chief says, ‘Don’t go there or you will 
die’, they’ll say ‘ah, we don’t care and even if we die, there is no 
problem’. … the reason why people are challenging things at this 
time is because of guns. it is the time for people to die because 
when you want to die, you always challenge things. that’s why 
people die every time. last time, in the time of our fathers, 
people were not dying like this. Unless they were sick. But now 
it is because we have guns. that’s why we are dying. Because we 
don’t understand. …
last time, when we withdrew from the laŋo generation, we 
still wanted to be young. When you withdraw,41 you still have 
your [same age-set] brothers. But when we withdrew, the laŋo 
started killing us. So when they kill us, now we say, ‘oK, if it is like 
this, then oK, let’s kill each other’ because there is no one who 
can reject his [age-set] brother. that’s why we fought. But when 
people told us, it’s oK [to stop], we said oK. We accepted this 
because many of us had died. on the other side, many of them 
had also died. So we wanted to stop all this killing.42  
39 although age-sets are 
not geographically limited, 
they tend to emerge in 
western Pibor and then 
extend eastward to other 
parts of the region later on. 
at the time of this research, 
for example, there were no 
Kurenen age-set members 
in Pibor town or Boma but 
they will eventually reach 
there, too.
40 See: Ø. Rolandsen and 
i. Breidlid, ‘What is Youth 
Violence in Jonglei?’, PRio 
Paper, oslo: Peace Research 
institute of oslo, 2013.
41 Use of the word 
‘withdraw’ in this context 
is intentional. Because 
Murle males belong to the 
same age-set all their lives, 
a decision to leave their 
given age-set represents a 
conscious withdrawal on the 
part of an individual. this 
is also how a new age-set 
emerges: when a number 
of the younger males in the 
youngest age-set decide to 
leave (withdraw) and start 
a new younger age-set. 
this consequently leads 
to fighting between the 
newest, youngest age-set 
and the slightly older age-set 
from which they have just 
withdrawn, as the latter do 
not want any competition.
south sudan customary authorities18
this young man refers to the first half of 2017, when laŋo and 
Kurenen age-set youth violently clashed in Manyirang. these 
clashes ceased in July 2017, when Sultan ismael Konyi intervened 
and succeeded in negotiating peace between the two sides, an 
age-set peace, which by November 2017 had remained in place. 
those who are able to resolve conflicts, including age-set conflicts, 
are those who derive power and authority from multiple sources. 
a controversial figure, Sultan ismael Konyi has been able to draw 
on his authority as a senior government official and political figure, 
a former military commander and a red chief to impose his will. 
42 interview with young 
man from the Kurenen age-
set, irith village, Manyirang 
payam, 21 october 2017. 
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4. drawing on multiple sources of authority
Red chiefs and government chiefs have different means to exert 
power and impose their will. this is why when the same individ-
ual embodies multiple sources of authority, he is usually more 
successful in influencing actions. 
Red chiefs possess the ability to curse as a means to enforce 
decisions and impose their will through the fear it inspires in 
others. the ability to instill fear and respect through cursing is 
contingent on the extent to which those who are cursed by a 
red chief actually suffer the consequences of the curse, which 
is usually death. to make this point, Chief Charburo—a red chief 
from the ŋarɔti clan and paramount chief of Kongor—recalls one 
episode during the 2013 clashes between the government’s SPla 
and the largely Murle insurgency, the SSDM/a–CF.43 Charburo was 
robbed by a man on the road, though the thief’s friends advised 
him against it, knowing Chief Charburo was a red chief. at the 
time, Chief Charburo said, ‘let him go but he will die.’ immediately, 
when fighting took place, the thief was killed. For Chief Charburo, 
this meant that the power of red chiefs was again on the rise 
because during the 2012–2013 clashes many of those who had 
‘disrespected [red] chiefs, they were cursed and died’, legitimizing 
the power of red chiefs and instilling fear in the power of cursing. 
in this regard, there is also a temporal distinction between 
the ways in which spiritual authority and government authority 
operate and are socially interpreted. When someone is cursed by 
a red chief, the curse and its implications may take a while to occur, 
whereas the power of government is immediately effective. When 
asked how he deploys his power, Charburo, who is both a red chief 
and a government paramount chief, explains: ‘For me, i’m using 
both. if i want something now-now, i’ll use government force. My 
position in the government is what i’m now deploying. i’m working 
for the government. if i feel i am having some difficulties in a case, 
i will request power from the government.’  
For many chiefs and others across Murleland, having the power 
of government behind them, especially its military might (whether 
through the police or army), has become more important and influ-
ential than the spiritual power of red chiefs.44 the authority of red 
chiefs no longer simply derives from only being a red chief. Rather, 
43 interview with Chief 
Charburo lokoli, red chief 
from the ŋarɔti clan and 
paramount chief of Kongor, 
Pibor town, 19 october 
2017. the quoted interview 
material presented in this 
paragraph and the next is all 
drawn from this source.
44 interview with sub-chief 
of Kongor, Kongor, 21 april 
2015.
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authority issues from how this spiritual authority intersects with 
and builds upon other forms of power. Baba Kudumoch, govern-
ment chief of Manyirang payam and also a red chief from the ŋarɔti 
clan insists that ‘chiefs should work with government’, regretting 
that chiefs do not ‘have government forces that can enforce our 
decisions’.45 Chief Baba also points out other issues facing red 
chiefs: ‘there is a challenge facing red chiefs. if there’s fighting, 
you may try to use your authority as a red chief but you may find 
there’s also another red chief from another age-set. that’s also 
another of the challenges. When we try to request government 
forces, the age-sets within [government] also interfere.’46 the chief 
is referring to the allegiances and forces pulling a man to choose 
between his commitment to and the interests of his age-set, and 
those of government.  
it is not only the inherited spiritual authority or government 
authority and military strength that counts. Chiefs require a 
number of other attributes in order to be respected. they require 
a certain charisma, the gift of speech and the ability to speak the 
truth. they also need the skill to listen, and to be generous and fair. 
amoyo Kiron theuwa is a red chief from the taŋajon clan and the 
deputy paramount chief of Pibor County since 2012. He explains 
that the order to select him as a deputy paramount chief came 
from government but that he was elected by various chiefs. He 
reflects on the reasons why he was elected, which resonate with 
the attributes desired for a chief. ‘First, i’m humble. Second, i know 
how to study cases. third, i know how to talk. and fourth, i like to 
help people.’47 For many Murle people across different age-sets, 
Sultan ismael Konyi appears to embody these features, particularly 
in his ability to speak the language that his audience understands 
and trusts.
45 interview with Baba 
Kudumoch, government 
chief of Manyirang and red 
chief from the ŋarɔti clan, 
Pibor town 21 october 2017.
46 interview with Baba 
Kudumoch, government 
chief of Manyirang and red 
chief from the ŋarɔti clan, 
Pibor town 21 october 2017.
47 interview with amoyo 
Kiron theuwa, red chief 
from the taŋajon clan and 
deputy paramount chief of 
Pibor South county, Pibor 
town, 21 october 2017. 
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5. Sultan Ismael Konyi
‘He has power not only to curse yo u but military power and 
government power and connections.’48
Sultan ismael Konyi is one of the most prominent Murle leaders 
alive. For nearly 40 years, he has successfully negotiated and 
strengthened his various sources of authority among his Murle 
constituency. He is a savvy senior political figure, a former military 
commander who established the PDF and, importantly, a red 
chief from the ŋarɔti clan.49 He has remained socially and polit-
ically relevant both in his Murle community and in the wider 
national political context of South Sudan. insights into the sultan’s 
life, through his own words, shed light on the various social and 
political roles he plays, as well as on the multiple sources of power 
and authority he exercises. 
Converging sources of authority
ismael Konyi, whose original name is alan Guzulu, was born in 
1942 in the village of Muur in Pibor County into a relatively poor 
family, the second of three brothers. He moved to Pibor town with 
his uncle to attend school, after whom he adopted the name Konyi. 
He also converted to islam (his uncle’s religion) and took ismael as 
his Muslim name, becoming known as ismael Konyi. although no 
longer formally a sultan (paramount chief), ismael Konyi continues 
to be referred to as such by many people. the title ‘sultan’ is a term 
of endearment that he acknowledges and enjoys. Sultan ismael 
Konyi offers a short overview of his life and the various positions 
he has held:
i was born in 1942 in a village called Muur. in 1943, when i was 
still young, my father migrated here and settled in tenet in a 
place called Kavachoch, nowadays known as ɔle ci Meri50 i grew 
up here. Since i migrated here, [to Pibor] i studied in Pibor Boys 
Primary School. after primary school in Pibor, i went to Kodok 
Secondary School [in Upper Nile]. in secondary school, one day 
i left for traditional dancing without permission of the teachers 
and was chased out of school. So i went to Malakal and found 
that the government was recruiting police and searching for 
48 interview with 
Murle intellectual, Juba, 
17 october 2017.
49 in particular, Konyi 
belongs to the ŋachimor 
sub-clan, which is senior to 
the ŋaloga sub-clan. 
50 ‘ɔle ci Meri’ translates 
literally as ‘Red People’, but 
is referring to ‘the place of 
red chiefs’.  
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people who knew how to read and write. i submitted my appli-
cation and was called for an interview that i passed and was 
recruited as a police officer in Malakal. 
in 1972, an order was sent from the police headquarters in 
Khartoum saying that all educated policemen were needed in 
Khartoum to join the army. i qualified to join the army but was 
first taken for military training in Khartoum for six months, after 
which i returned to Malakal as an army officer. in the same year 
of 1972, i was transferred from Malakal to Juba and then on 
to Bor as security intelligence, representing Pibor for two years 
until i resigned and came to Pibor in 1976. 
People in Pibor were desperately looking for a good person to be 
appointed as chief. i was among 12 nominees competing for the 
position and was appointed as paramount chief in 1980. i started 
my work in 1980, attending some workshops in Bor in 1981 and 
1982. By 1983, the SPla war broke out. But to me, Murle people 
were safer in the hands of the Khartoum regime, so i came to 
Pibor and advised the Murle youth not to join the SPlM/a, and 
instead mobilized them to protect our cattle, our families and 
our land, and they agreed. 
During 1984 and 1985, the SPla were always attacking us here. 
then in 1987, the SPla displaced us from the barracks and we 
had to run to Malakal. While we were in Malakal, an order was 
sent from Khartoum saying we need you and your youth to be 
soldiers in our army, and i accepted. Some of my forces joined 
the SaF [Sudanese armed Forces] and were promoted to officers 
and i was promoted as a major general. 
in 1993, i was appointed as the commissioner of Pibor and i 
worked as commissioner for ten years. in 2003, i was appointed 
as governor of Jonglei [State] and then in 2005 i was later 
appointed to the legislative assembly. in 2007, i was appointed 
as presidential advisor for peace and reconciliation. in 2009, i 
was removed from being an advisor and appointed the deputy 
chairperson of the peace and reconciliation committee for the 
[ten] states. i held that position until 18 January 2017, when i 
was appointed by the president as the governor of Boma State.51 
throughout these roles, i remained as the sultan of Pibor.52
as ismael Konyi notes, he is a red chief by birth, although not the 
firstborn son. He was appointed as paramount chief of the Murle 
51 McCallum (2013) reports 
a different account, stating 
that when ismael Konyi 
joined the SPlM/a after the 
Juba Declaration in 2006, 
he became the peace and 
development advisor to 
Salva Kiir Mayardit and was 
later appointed a member 
of the Council of States, a 
chamber of the South Sudan 
national legislature.
52 interview with Sultan 
ismael Konyi, Pibor town, 
21 october 2017.
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in 1980, a position he occupied until 2008.53 His political appoint-
ments were given by both the government of Sudan in Khartoum 
and the government of South Sudan in Juba because he came to be 
seen as the means to garner the support of the Murle community. 
one Murle intellectual explains:
Sultan [ismael] was the focal point for the Murle with the 
Sudanese government, and the Sudanese government was 
looking at South Sudan through tribes. they’re the ones who 
built him. the Murle people like cattle and guns, and if you help 
them to marry. the Sultan did that through the north and he 
distributed weapons. the government of South Sudan wanted to 
keep the sultan as the focal point for Murle but the Murle who 
were in the SPla rejected that. Because if you have support of 
the sultan, you have the support of the community.54
in an account presented earlier in this paper, Sultan ismael 
makes reference to the SPla war and how he discouraged Murle 
youth from joining the SPla movement, instead urging them to 
remain at home to protect their cattle, families and land. this 
is also how these actions were widely understood among the 
lowland Murle—as a means to protect the community from 
external attacks. Many young Murle, however, chose to join the 
SPlM/a. this was the case in the lowlands and especially in the 
highlands of Boma, which was the first place captured by the 
SPlM/a in april 1985. this also functioned as the SPlM/a’s main 
headquarters throughout the initial years of struggle against the 
Khartoum government.55
Perhaps what has strengthened ismael Konyi’s authority the 
most over the last 40 years is that he has been perceived as a 
protector of the Murle, politically, spiritually and militarily (through 
the distribution of weapons). as Kaku aturuk Kutura, one of the 
co-founders of the PDF with ismael Konyi, asserts, ‘Commanders 
are the ones protecting the community. they’re more important 
than chiefs.’56
protecting the murle
One of the reasons I established the PDF was because of theft and 
raiding in my area. I formed community policing to prevent these 
cases. When it was 1983, and the [SPLA] rebellion occurred, I 
advised them [youth] not to join but to stay here to protect the 
53 in 2010, the former 
Pibor county commissioner, 
akot Maze, removed Sultan 
ismael Konyi from the 
position of paramount chief 
and appointed the late 
Ngantho Kavula in his stead. 
54 interview with 
Murle intellectual, Juba, 
17 october 2017.
55 For a more in-depth 
discussion on this point, see: 
Felix da Costa, ‘this Word, 
it is for Murle’, 68-106; and 
McCallum, ‘Murle identity in 
Post-Colonial South Sudan’, 
11-24.
56 interview with Kaku 
aturuk Kutura, founder and 
former PDF commander, 
Doroŋwa age-set, Juba, 
16 october 2017.
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Murle and their resources. The main reason I formed the PDF 
was due to internal crimes; then in the time of the rebellion in 
1983, to protect the Murle from external attacks.57
according to ismael Konyi, he first brought Murle youth together in 
what he above terms as ‘community policing’ to address internal 
criminality among the Murle. the group was initially called ‘shabab’ 
(youth) and was part of Sudanese president Jaafar Nimeiri’s youth 
mobilization policy across Sudan.58 then, in 1983, to address the 
threat of the SPlM/a in Pibor, ismael transformed the shabab 
into the PDF (the Berget). the PDF became a local Murle defence 
militia in Pibor aligned with the Khartoum government. its primary 
role was to protect against external threats facing the Murle. the 
Khartoum government saw the PDF as a cost-effective means 
to fight the SPla and provided generous quantities of uniforms, 
weapons and ammunition to the Murle through Sultan ismael 
Konyi, who had direct access to Khartoum. as one Murle intel-
lectual explains, ‘From 1983 to 2003, for 20 years you couldn’t do 
anything [in Pibor] without the support of the PDF.’59 the supply 
of weapons was understood locally by the Murle as a means to 
protect themselves from the external threats of hostile neigh-
bours, who for the most part supported the SPla. 
the PDF were one of several pro-Khartoum militias that were 
part of the umbrella SSDF, which were used by the Sudanese 
government as southern proxies to fight the SPla.60 arguably, 
however, the PDF were unique among the SSDF because Sultan 
ismael’s justification for the movement was ‘strongly based upon 
the desire to protect the Murle community and identity, fulfilling 
the traditional protection role of the alan in a new way.’61 another 
observer similarly points out that the PDF ‘had a strong identity 
centred on notions of defending the Murle people. it is interesting 
to note that while members of the PDF consider ismail Konyi to 
be a SSDF general (as well as in SaF), he was most importantly a 
commander of the Murle’.62
During this period, when ismael Konyi was simultaneously 
playing the role of paramount chief, Berget commander and senior 
government official, his wealth significantly increased through 
perhaps three primary means: First, as a government official with 
direct access to Khartoum and a continuous supply of weapons; 
second, as a paramount chief (sultan), whereby a portion of the 
compensation resulting from dispute resolution is traditionally 
paid to the chief responsible for reaching a settlement; and third, 
57 interview with Murle 
intellectual, Juba 17 october 
2017.
58 interview with 
Murle intellectual, Juba, 
17 october 2017.
59 interview with 
Murle intellectual, Juba, 
17 october 2017.
60 See arnold, ‘the South 
Sudan Defence Force’.
61 McCallum, ‘Murle 
identity in Post-Colonial 
South Sudan’, 133.
62 arnold, ‘the South Sudan 
Defence Force’, 504.
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using his simultaneous spiritual and political role as a red chief 
and paramount chief, and his military and political role as a Berget 
commander, he prohibited the Murle from raiding their neigh-
bours. When youth from the thithi age-set raided their Nuer and 
Dinka neighbours and returned with cattle, for example, Sultan 
ismael sent Berget to collect the raided cattle on the pretense that 
they would be returned to their rightful owners. While cattle were 
indeed often returned, they were also sometimes integrated into 
the herd of Sultan ismael. one observer notes that Sultan ismael 
has been strategic in forming clan and family ties by marrying into 
all the Murle clans, thus providing him with a wide base of support 
and relationships of reciprocity.63 He used the raided cattle he kept 
to marry the more than 40 wives he is said to have (and with whom 
he has 168 children).64 He is also said to have supported many of 
his PDF soldiers in marriage and other Murle youth in pursuing an 
education, thus further cementing relationships of loyalty, depen-
dency and debt.65
cementing relationships, power and authority
‘ The sultan will never refuse anyone.’66
across Murleland, Sultan ismael Konyi is spoken of as charismatic 
and generous, even by those who are not politically aligned with 
him. over the last forty years, he has not only helped hundreds 
of men to marry but he is said to have supported ‘thousands’ of 
Murle boys and young men in pursuing their education.67 He is 
also said to have sponsored a large number of the current cadre 
of Murle intellectuals and political elite from the Muden, thithi, 
Bothonya and laŋo age-sets, including those Murle who now hold 
senior positions in the government of Boma State. one of those 
who was sponsored by Sultan ismael and is now a government 
official explains:
this guy has got his own way of thinking. Whenever he’s together 
with those who are educated, since he’s not well qualified [in 
formal education], he can use this issue of [his role as] red 
chief. and when he was Berget commander, he was a Berget 
commander and at the same time commissioner. He used to 
pay the school fees of thousands of people. Whoever became 
a politician here was actually supported by him. this guy has 
supported thousands of people, including myself. Yes, whenever 
63 McCallum, ‘Murle 
identity in Post-Colonial 
South Sudan’, 136.
64 interview with Sultan 
ismael Konyi, Pibor town, 
21 october 2017.
65 interview with Murle 
intellectual, Juba, 17 
october 2017.
66 interview with John Kaka, 
county commissioner of 
Pibor South, Pibor town, 
24 october 2017.
67 interview with John Kaka, 
county commissioner of 
Pibor South, Pibor town, 
24 october 2017.
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he says something, he will be understood because of what he 
has done for you. Not me alone, including the ministers.68 
after his time as Berget commander and senior government 
official in various capacities, ismael Konyi has continued to sponsor 
youth in school and marriage: ‘Whenever you run to him, you will 
be helped. if you face difficulties of school fees this year, you run 
to the sultan and you will be helped.’69 Sultan ismael’s support 
is perceived as fair. He does not privilege his own relatives but 
supports individuals across age-sets and from across the region. 
as an example of the sultan’s generosity, one government official 
explains that as recently as august 2017, Sultan ismael had sent 
USD 16,000 to six Murle students in China studying geology, who 
are expected to return to Boma State and use their skills for the 
development of the region.70 Generosity is a prided value among 
the Murle, the coping mechanisms and support structures of 
whom rely on relationships and extended networks: 
You know, he’s generous. in our culture, or even worldwide, and 
i’m sure it’s been reduced in america and in developed countries, 
but here, you see, our people, they used to be beggars a lot. Can 
you give me? i’m hungry. Can you give me food? … Whatever the 
sultan has, he can give. take it. Until we are ashamed of asking 
the sultan, give me. even if he has one pound in his pocket, he 
will give it away and he will stay without food all day. that’s why 
you see that the sultan is ever popular. He’s ever popular.71   
Sultan ismael has also used his daughters to build consensus 
and cement relationships across dissenting Murle factions. For 
instance, in order to bring back to government Paulino Zangil and 
John Welarum, who had defected to the SPla-io and the splinter 
group of the SSDM/a–CF led by General Boutros Khaled, respec-
tively, the sultan offered both men two of his daughters as wives, 
agreeing that the required bridewealth cattle would be paid later. 
among the Murle, marriage always involves the payment of cattle 
as bridewealth from the groom to the bride’s family. this exchange 
serves to assert relationships and building alliances within and 
between families. 
there are differing views on why Sultan ismael Konyi is well 
respected, which has been consistently the case for a long time. 
this is a difficult achievement in the fragile political landscape of 
South Sudan. elders from his own age-set emphasize that this 
may be the case ‘because he’s Berget, governor, but most of all, 
68 interview with 
government official, Pibor 
town, 24 october 2017.
69 interview with 
government official, Pibor 
town, 24 october 2017.
70 interview with 
government official, Pibor 
town, 24 october 2017.
71 interview with 
government official, Pibor 
town, 24 october 2017.
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because he’s alan ci meri.’72 Young people from the Bothonya 
age-set and below explain that ‘ever since we were born, we hear 
about him from our parents; how he’s a good man, how he’s fair’.73 
across age-sets, Sultan ismael is perceived as someone who is able 
to protect the Murle and advocate for their rights. Perhaps what 
makes him so successful in garnering the support of most Murle, 
however, is his social and political astuteness in understanding his 
audience, and strategically selecting and deploying authority and 
language accordingly. John Kaka used to be the sultan’s personal 
secretary and also benefited from his financial support during his 
university studies. He explains the sultan’s wisdom:
He’s using mostly the word of red chiefs, the word of being 
sultan. He doesn’t use the words of a governor. it’s like people 
could not understand he’s governor so he applies the words of 
a red chief. You know, i became his private secretary for almost 
four years, for the sultan. i used to sit with him in a private place, 
and ask, ‘Sultan, why are you always popular?’... When we were 
in Malakal, in 2009, we were accommodated in one place. My 
room was next to his, and i tried to come to him at around ten or 
midnight, saying, ‘Sultan i need you. Can you wake up?’ He said, 
‘John, what happened to you?’ i said, ‘i actually need to capture 
some few words from you. Why are you always popular?’
He told me, ‘if you want to be popular, first, you greet everybody 
in nice language. … Whatever you have, give to the poorest 
people. leave alone the richest and don’t be a proud person [be 
humble]. if a small child says stop, you stop and listen to what he 
or she has to say to you. and don’t give your money according to 
class. Give whatever to all classes—whether first class or second 
class; whether poor or whatever. Give, give. if you do things in 
this way, you will see yourself, you will be popular. that’s why 
i’m popular.’
i told him, ‘You used to, sometimes, give negative promises that 
“you come tomorrow, come tomorrow”. Why do you do this?’ 
He said, ‘You know, human beings are human beings. When they 
come to you, they know you are the highest authority. You are 
the highest person. You are a person who has got everything. if 
someone comes to you and says, “John, give me money” and you 
say, “No, i don’t have any”, he or she will go and die. it’s better 
to say, “You come tomorrow” so that she has hope of getting 
something. Come tomorrow.’ if you go to him now, the sultan 
72 interview with elder, 
Konyo Konyo area, Juba, 
16 october 2017.
73 interview with youth 
from the Laŋo age-set, Pibor 
town, 20 october 2017.
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will not say, “i don’t have”. He’ll say, “No, come tomorrow.” if he 
has nothing to give you, he’ll say, “Come tomorrow”. He’s just 
postponing you. Don’t cry. Don’t die. Just come tomorrow. then 
if you meet and he has something tomorrow, he’ll give, [if] not, 
just come tomorrow again. He keeps on, ‘tomorrow, tomorrow’, 
until he gets something [to give away].74
Not all Murle agree on the sultan’s altruistic generosity or his 
predisposition to support Murle youth in pursuing an education. 
other less politically connected Murle youth disagree with the 
claim of the sultan’s alleged generosity, noting that it is self-inter-
ested and self-motivated, designed to build strategic alliances of 
support to keep himself in power. as one young man asserts, ‘He 
just wants to remain in power forever.’75
Still, the sultan’s ability to remain socially and politically 
relevant in the volatile Murle political arena suggests that he has 
been able to build upon different aspects and sources of power to 
develop his authority and legitimacy among the Murle. He is also 
able to do so outside the Murle community, building relationships 
with the government in Khartoum and, since the 2005 CPa, with 
the government in Juba, presenting himself as the most authentic 
representative of his community.  
Youth and chiefship
From January 2017 to January 2018, ismael Konyi was governor 
of Boma State. While acting in this role, some Murle intellectuals 
and politicians came to resent the sultan because he cultivates and 
speaks the language of tradition, which partially excludes them. 
instead, some educated segments of Murle society are calling 
for the language of government. While some Murle intellectuals 
and politicians seek to diminish the authority of red chiefs, Sultan 
ismael Konyi, by contrast, understands and values red chiefs as 
individuals who are still able to muster the support of their 
communities and respective age-sets. this is especially the case 
in rural areas, which still constitute the majority of Murleland. 
as such, Sultan ismael Konyi chooses to deploy language that his 
audience understands. With reference to the clashes between the 
laŋo and Kurenen age-sets in Manyirang, the role he played in 
addressing those tensions and why these youth listened to him, 
ismael explains:
74 interview with John Kaka, 
county commissioner of 
Pibor South, Pibor town, 
24 october 2017.
75 Personal communication 
with young man from 
the Bothonya age-set, 
13 December 2017. 
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at the moment, i have two leadership roles. First, i am a red 
chief, then followed by governor. i talk as a governor first, then 
if they don’t listen, i’ll use the system of red chief. Many Murle 
are illiterate. they only believe in customary laws, rather than 
government laws, because it is this system of red chiefs that 
keeps us together. that’s why if i talk to [rural] laŋo and Kurenen 
[age-sets], they listen to me. the third thing that makes them 
listen to me—there is one issue. Murle as a whole know me since 
i began being a leader. i am prominent among all. if i go to them, 
if they’re fighting, they will stop. even if any of my wives go, 
they’ll stop. … 
also, the issue of being prominent, it makes them listen to me. 
i was playing a very big role, not just leading people but also 
bringing some changes. For example, when i was growing up 
and was given leadership, i saw all Murle walking around naked 
and having no interest in school or government. they were all 
cattle-keepers. i’ve changed some of these ideas. Before they 
were all tattooing their faces and removing the [two lower front] 
teeth. i discouraged these practices and advised youth to forget 
these old kinds of traditions. i was also focusing on the rights 
of Murle. Until now, Murle [finally] have some rights [in South 
Sudan]. that’s why you see many Murle are now educated and 
well dressed. the only issue is that of killing one another and i’m 
here now to stop that. …
i talk to the youth. i don’t want to impose [ideas] on them by 
force. i try to talk to them as individuals and i hope they under-
stand me without force. Maybe it’s a gift and a privilege [to be 
listened to]. Sometimes i go to Jie, Didinga and [Dinka] Bor and 
they listen to me, too. that’s why so many youths listen to me. 
their fathers and mothers tell them about me since they’re 
small.76   
two young cattle-keepers from the Kurenen age-set who had 
been involved in the clashes with the laŋo age-set explain how 
the sultan brought them together and used his authority as a red 
chief, saying that ismael Konyi ‘was coming with the army and with 
the soldiers. then from here, we were taken by our chiefs’.77 Sultan 
ismael mobilized the political and military authority and power of 
government, alongside the community authority of government 
chiefs, and red chiefs. in front of the army, government officials, 
government chiefs and red chiefs from all generations, Sultan 
76 interview with Sultan 
ismael Konyi, Pibor town, 
21 october 2017.
77 interview with young 
man from the Kurenen age-
set, irith village, Manyirang 
payam, 21 october 2017.
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ismael Konyi addressed the red chiefs of the Kurenen and laŋo 
age-sets. one of the youth recalls:
He called all of us, and in addition to this, he also called all the 
red chiefs from all the other generations. then he said, ‘all the 
black commoners, you have no problem. the problem are the 
red chiefs. You are the ones making people fight because if a 
black commoner wants to say something important, you don’t 
understand it.’ Now, from there, he took a bullet and buried it. 
then he said, ‘if you shoot someone again, this bullet will turn 
to you.’78
this explanation suggests that youth respect the threat of a curse 
by a red chief as powerful as Sultan ismael Konyi. For the other 
young man, his generation had listened to the sultan ‘because he 
is powerful. everyone listens to him, on both sides. on the side of 
the government, he’s very big. and on the side of the red chiefs, he 
is also leading. So everyone is fearing’. these two twenty-year old 
Kurenen age-set members had heard of sultan from their fathers 
as they grew up: 
During the fighting between the government and arabs, he 
[the sultan] was the one taking control of the area here. He 
was powerful. He was bringing guns. He was the one supplying 
everyone here. So those who went to the other side, to the SPlM, 
he cursed some of them. and those people did not return. that’s 
why the elders explained to us that we should not be against 
what the sultan is doing.79
For the youth from irith village in Manyirang payam in Pibor 
County, an area where the government is not formally repre-
sented, the authority of red chiefs continues to be respected and 
unchallenged. ‘Whenever we are in a group and we are planning 
to do something and the red chief says we have to do it, then if 
black commoners like us say, “No, this thing is not good. let’s not 
do that”, they’ll say “No, this population is mine, for my father. You 
have no power. You cannot challenge [me]”.’80 another young man 
adds, ‘if they send you to fight, you go.’81
For the two Kurenen youth from Manyirang, both black 
commoners, the authority of the red chiefs in their age-set in their 
area remains certain, sacred and undisputed. Whether for peace 
or for war, their decisions should be embraced and respected. 
While red chief authority is nuanced and not the case for all youth 
everywhere across Boma State, nonetheless the comments of 
78 interview with young 
man from the Kurenen age-
set, irith village, Manyirang 
payam, 21 october 2017. 
79 interview with another 
young man from Kurenen 
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Manyirang payam, 
21 october 2017. 
80 interview with young 
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81 interview with another 
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these two young black commoners suggest that their view of red 
chiefs is contrary to a prevalent assumption. that is, that youth 
are disenchanted by the moral, spiritual and political authority 
of chiefs. in contrast, these rural youth in Murleland continue to 
respect their age-set red chiefs and age-sets remain one of the 
core pillars of Murle society. the views expressed by these two 
young men indicate the importance both of recognizing the subtle-
ties through which age-set authority is exercised and of navigating 
the complex webs of Murle spiritual, moral and political authority 
in rural areas where the state does not reach.
it is clear that Sultan ismael Konyi embodies the ability to 
embrace various diverse forms of authority, revealing how these 
are not necessarily in competition but rather build on and reinforce 
each other. Speaking of the sultan, Kaku aturuk Kutura succinctly 
sums this up: ‘they fear him because of the words that come out 
of his mouth. He speaks the truth. He’s not respected because 
he’s the governor. He’d have the same respect if he wasn’t the 
governor.’82
82 interview with Kaku 
aturuk Kutura, former PDF 
commander, Doroŋwa age-
set, Juba 16 october 2017.
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6. conclusion
as this study indicates, it is important to emphasize the resilience 
and adaptive edge of authority structures within Murle society. 
this is not unique to the Murle community and there are multiple 
examples from other parts of South Sudan where the creative 
adaptability of chieftaincy can be witnessed.83 the case of the 
Murle is, however, perhaps particularly relevant because of how 
its society is often represented as lacking internal leadership struc-
tures and as unreceptive to authority. this may be part and parcel 
of the ways in which Murle people are negatively stereotyped 
in South Sudan. Clearly, the challenge is not the lack of credible 
authority structures among the Murle but rather the abundance 
of these structures and the difficulties they pose for the ability 
of outsiders to navigate them. Considerations of Murle chiefship 
need to take into account the complex internal hierarchies of red 
chiefs, especially in terms of clans and the politics of age-sets. they 
also need to account for how chiefs creatively and strategically 
deploy and make use of different sources of authority and power 
to make their voices heard. 
Contrary to generalized claims, youth respect their chiefs, 
in particular those who are perceived to embody the qualities 
a chief should have such as community protectors, guides and 
rescuers. the effectiveness of these qualities may rely on the 
overlap of various sources of authority. the power of red chiefs 
and the power of government is simultaneously aligned and in 
competition. on the one hand, the most successful chiefs are 
those who embody multiple sources of power, combining tradi-
tional spiritual authority with government authority. on the 
other hand, in asserting their strength, members of the elite in 
government challenge the authority of red chiefs but this partially 
alienates those same government officials from the population at 
large. 
Red chiefs continue to be the only source of law and order 
available in many rural areas. they speak the cultural and moral 
language that rural people understand and to which they can 
relate. those leaders, such as Sultan ismael, who recognize and 
embrace this are able to draw on multiple sources of legitimacy and 
authority and thus command respect among their constituencies. 
83 See: C. leonardi, 
Dealing with Government 
in South Sudan: Histories 
of Chiefship, Community 
and State, eastern africa 
Series, Woodbridge, Suffolk: 
James Currey, 2013 and 
N. Kindersley, Politics, power 
and chiefship in famine and 
war: A study of the former 
Northern Bahr el-Ghazal 
state, South Sudan, Nairobi, 
Rift Valley institute, 2018.
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in this regard, it is necessary to better understand and appreciate 
their experiences as red chiefs.
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Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases
alan  (Murle) leader, chief; typically refers to a 
red chief; original meaning: ‘to rescue’.
alan ci meri  (Murle; singular form) red chief
alat ci merik  (Murle; plural form) red chiefs
buul (Murle) age-set or generation
CPa Comprehensive Peace agreement (2005)
GPaa Greater Pibor administrative area 
payam  second lowest administrative division, 
below counties
PDF Pibor Defence Forces 
SaF Sudan armed Forces 
shabab (Arabic) youth
SPlM/a Sudan People’s liberation Movement/
army  
SSDF South Sudan Defence Forces 
SSDM/a–CF South Sudan Defence Movement/army–
Cobra Faction
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Carrada Ayaan Dhunkannay: Waa socdaalkii 
tahriibka ee Somaliland ilaa badda 
Medhitereeniyanka
Sheekadani waa waraysigii ugu horreeyay ee ku saabsan 
waayo aragnimadii wiil dhallinyaro ah oo reer Somali-
land oo taahriibay. Also in English.
Selected RVI publications
Expectations and belonging 
in Dire Dawa
This report analyses the drivers 
and dynamics of rural to urban 
migration in Ethiopia and the 
impacts on the physical and social 
infrastructure in Dire Dawa.
International, national and local political 
discourses often portray the Murle 
community as principal aggressors and 
the source of much of the instability 
affecting former Jonglei State in South 
Sudan. Although such negative stereotypes 
are partially driven by actual events, they 
are also manipulated by certain groups 
to serve political purposes and informed 
by the assumption that there is a lack of 
credible authority structure among the 
Murle. Changing Power Among Murle 
Chiefs investigates how Murle customary 
authorities—in particular, red chiefs—
navigate and negotiate political, military and 
spiritual authority, while simultaneously 
challenging the view that Murle society 
has no organic leaderships structures. The 
challenge is not the absence of leadership 
structures but rather their abundance and 
the difficulties they pose for the ability of 
outsiders to navigate them.
